09.07.: Gastvortrag von Jean Moritz Müller (Universität Tübingen) im Philosophen Institutskolloquium im SoSe24
Das Institut lädt zum dritten Philosophischen Institutskolloquium im SoSe 24 ein.
Am Dienstag, den 09.07. um 16 Uhr (c.t.) spricht Jean Moritz Müller zum Thema: „Are Attitudes Intentional Under a Description?"
Der Vortrag findet in Raum 2.213, Emil-Figge-Str. 50 statt.
Abstract des Vortrags:
Following Anscombe (1957) most action theorists suppose that intentional actions are intentional under a description. This view (which I call the action-under-description-view or Act-D, for short) accounts for intentional action as being non-accidental. An act performed under a corresponding description is no accident as far as the agent is concerned: it can be credited to her. In this talk, I examine whether the analogous view holds true of intentional attitudes: are beliefs, desires, and emotions intentional under a description, too? As I understand it, this parallel view (call this attitude-under-description-view or Att-D, for short) claims that an intentional attitude is held under a description much like an action is performed under a description. Att-D is quite unusual, not least because it is common to suppose that the term ‘intentional’ has a different meaning when applied to attitudes than when applied to actions. I will offer some grounds for thinking that, despite its unorthodoxy, Att-D is correct. We have much the same reasons to accept Att-D that we have to accept Act-D. My argument is based on the observation that intentional attitudes are non-accidental in being creditable to the agent, too.