09.07.: Gastvortrag von Jean Moritz Müller (Universität Tübingen) im Philosophen Institutskolloquium im SoSe24
Am Dienstag, den 09.07. um 16 Uhr (c.t.) spricht Jean Moritz Müller zum Thema: „Are Attitudes Intentional Under a Description?"
Der Vortrag findet in Raum 2.213, Emil-Figge-Str. 50 statt.
Abstract des Vortrags:
Following Anscombe (1957) most action theorists suppose that intentional actions are intentional under a description. This view (which I call the action-under-description-view or Act-D, for short) accounts for intentional action as being non-accidental. An act performed under a corresponding description is no accident as far as the agent is concerned: it can be credited to her. In this talk, I examine whether the analogous view holds true of intentional attitudes: are beliefs, desires, and emotions intentional under a description, too? As I understand it, this parallel view (call this attitude-under-description-view or Att-D, for short) claims that an intentional attitude is held under a description much like an action is performed under a description. Att-D is quite unusual, not least because it is common to suppose that the term ‘intentional’ has a different meaning when applied to attitudes than when applied to actions. I will offer some grounds for thinking that, despite its unorthodoxy, Att-D is correct. We have much the same reasons to accept Att-D that we have to accept Act-D. My argument is based on the observation that intentional attitudes are non-accidental in being creditable to the agent, too.