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Fakultät Humanwissenschaften und Theologie

09.07.: Gastvortrag von Jean Moritz Müller (Universität Tübingen) im Philosophen Institutskolloquium im SoSe24

Das Institut lädt zum dritten Philosophischen Institutskolloquium im SoSe 24 ein.

Am Dienstag, den 09.07. um 16 Uhr (c.t.) spricht Jean Moritz Müller zum Thema: „Are Attitudes Intentional  Under a Description?"

Der Vortrag findet in Raum 2.213, Emil-Figge-Str. 50 statt.

Abstract des Vortrags:


Following Anscombe (1957) most action theorists suppose that  intentional actions are intentional under a description. This view  (which I call the action-under-description-view or Act-D, for short)  accounts for intentional action as being non-accidental. An act  performed under a corresponding description is no accident as far as  the agent is concerned: it can be credited to her. In this talk, I  examine whether the analogous view holds true of intentional  attitudes: are beliefs, desires, and emotions intentional under a  description, too? As I understand it, this parallel view (call this  attitude-under-description-view or Att-D, for short) claims that an  intentional attitude is held under a description much like an action  is performed under a description. Att-D is quite unusual, not least  because it is common to suppose that the term ‘intentional’ has a  different meaning when applied to attitudes than when applied to  actions. I will offer some grounds for thinking that, despite its  unorthodoxy, Att-D is correct. We have much the same reasons to accept  Att-D that we have to accept Act-D. My argument is based on the  observation that intentional attitudes are non-accidental in being  creditable to the agent, too.