Workshop: Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Dilemmas
Workshop des DFG-Projekts „Epistemische Dilemmata, normative Konflikte und epistemische Normativität“ am Institut vom 2.-4. September 2024.
Speakers:
Joshua Brecka (Toronto)
Tez Clark (New York)
Martin Grajner (Dortmund)
Nick Hughes (Oslo)
Benjamin Kiesewetter (Bielefeld)
Anne Meylan (Zürich)
Andy Mueller (Frankfurt)
Chenwei Nie (Warwick)
Michele Palmira (Madrid)
Eva Schmidt (Dortmund)
Keshav Singh (Birmingham (Alabama))
Timothy Williamson (Oxford)
When:
September 2-4, 2024
Where:
Emil-Figge-Str. 50, R. 2.213, Department of Philosophy and Political Science, TU Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany
We're happy to make online attendance possible to registered participants upon request.
Topics:
- What is epistemic rationality?
- Is there a unified concept of epistemic rationality?
- Or do we need to bifurcate epistemic rationality into a structural and a substantive dimension? What are the benefits of conceiving epistemic rationality as so bifurcated?
- Can there be instances of rational epistemic akrasia?
- What are epistemic reasons? Are they genuinely normative?
- What is the relation between the epistemic and the practical domains? Does the practical encroach on the epistemic?
- How do practical considerations affect ideal epistemology?
- Can there be practical reasons for belief?
- What is higher-order evidence? Is it even evidence?
- How should we deal with (apparent) epistemic dilemmas, for examples dilemmas involving higher-order evidence?
- What is the nature of suspension? Is suspension sensitive to higher-order evidence?
Attendance:
Attendance is free, but registration is required. Please register by email at epistemicnormsgmailcom. The deadline for registration is August 15, 2024.
Organizing committee:
Martin Grajner (TU Dortmund): martin.grajnertu-dortmundde
Eva Schmidt (TU Dortmund): eva.schmidttu-dortmundde
Further Information: